Sunbeam Products, Inc v. The West Bend Co.: Exposing the Malign Application of the Federal Dilution Statute to Product Configurations by Heald, Paul
Journal of Intellectual Property Law
Volume 5




Sunbeam Products, Inc v. The West Bend Co.:
Exposing the Malign Application of the Federal
Dilution Statute to Product Configurations
Paul Heald
University of Georgia School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Intellectual
Property Law by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Georgia Law. Please share how you have benefited from this access For more
information, please contact tstriepe@uga.edu.
Recommended Citation
Paul Heald, Sunbeam Products, Inc v. The West Bend Co.: Exposing the Malign Application of the Federal Dilution Statute to Product
Configurations, 5 J. Intell. Prop. L. 415 (1998).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol5/iss2/3
SUNBEAM PRODUCTS, INC. V. THE WEST
BEND CO.: EXPOSING THE MALIGN
APPLICATION OF THE FEDERAL DILUTION
STATUTE TO PRODUCT CONFIGURATIONS
Paul Heald*
Some judicial opinions lack persuasive authority because they are
poorly written.1  Others establish dangerous precedent2  or
enshrine pernicious attitudes into law.3 Still others twist the
language of prior opinions or misuse legislative history. Although
a focus on rhetorical structure, effect on society, or quality of legal
reasoning is helpful in identifying what constitutes a very bad
judicial opinion, this essay will instead expose the blander evils of
indifference and inattentitveness. My "worst" opinion-Sunbeam
Products, Inc. v. The West Bend Co. 4-will not have a catastrophic
effect on American life and culture, but rather provides an
important illustration of how the broader cancer of over-expansive
intellectual property rights gains a toe-hold in the law.
In Sunbeam, the court considered the allegation by Sunbeam
Products that West Bend had wrongfully copied the design of its
classic Mixmaster. Claiming very plausibly that its well-known
design functioned as a trademark by identifying the source of the
product to consumers, Sunbeam argued that West Bend's similar
product was likely to confuse consumers5 and/or dilute6 the
* Professor of Law, University of Georgia. J.D., 1988, University of Chicago.
'See RICHARD WEISBERG, POETHICS AND OTHER STRATEGIES OF LAW AND LITERATURE 9
(1992) (arguing that the durability of a judicial opinion is directly related to how well it is
written, concluding that "poor craftsmanship even on [the part ofi the Supreme Court
ultimately brings an opinion down").
2 See, e.g., Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856) (holding that African-
Americans are not "persons" for the purposes of the Privileges and Immunities clause).
3 See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that segregation on the basis
of race is not a per se violation of the 14th Amendment).
' 39 U.S.P.Q.2d 1545 (S.D. Miss. 1996), affd 123 F.3d 246, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d 1161 (5th Cir.
1997) (affirming injunction for trademark infringement against stand mixer on likelihood of
confusion grounds only).
5 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (1994) ("Any person who.., uses.., any false designation
of origin [which] is likely to cause confusion. . . as to the origin ... of his of her goods...
shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.").
415
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distinctive qualities of its mark in violation of 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125.
The court's thorough discussion of the likelihood of consumer
confusion is relatively uncontroversial.7 If the overall design of the
mixer is non-functional, then Sunbeam is presumptively entitled to
injunctive relief against appropriations of its design that are likely
to confuse consumers. Unfortunately, after having determined that
an injunction on likelihood of cianfusion grounds should issue,8 the
court's opinion took a dangerous turn.
In a terse section that cited no precedent, the court improperly
construed the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C.A §
1125(c), to protect the design of Sunbeam's product even in the
absence of consumer confusion.9 Although § 1125(c) clearly applies
to protect famous word marks, it cannot be plausibly construed to
protect product configurations that may function as trademarks.
Like a potent new virus, Sunbeam is dangerous not only because
of its ultimately unhealthy holding, but because of the unobtrusive
and insidious manner in which it threatens to infect the corpus of
intellectual property law. In the hope of provoking the develop-
ment of a legal vaccine, this essay will consider, as the Sunbeam
opinion fails to, the full implications of applying federal dilution
law to protect product configurations.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF DILUTION LAW
The importance of the cause of action for trademark dilution, as
opposed to trademark infringement, is found in what the movant
need not allege: the likelihood that consumers will be confused by
the unauthorized use of the movant's trademark.'0 Although not
inevitably successful, a suit for dilution is easier to prove than
6 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. 1 1995) ("The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled
... to an injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes dilution of the
distinctive quality of the mark.").
7 See 39 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1552-54.
a Id. at 1556.
9 Id. at 1555.10 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25(1) (1995) ("One may be subject
to liability under the law of trademarks for the use of a designation that resembles the
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infringement because the troublesome factual question of consumer
confusion is not relevant. Interestingly, the genesis of the cause of
action for dilution is easy to pinpoint. In 1927, Frank Schechter
proposed that trademark law should be changed in order to protect
against the "gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity
and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon
non-competing goods." 1 As the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition notes, Schechter's novel proposal "required neither
consumer confusion nor competition between the users' goods or
services." " As early as 1947, states began to respond to Schech-
ter's suggestion, creating for the first time a statutory cause of
action for the trademark owner who could not demonstrate that
consumers were likely to be confused by the unauthorized use of its
mark by a third party.13 By 1995, twenty-five states had provided
trademark owners with a cause of action for the dilution of their
marks. 4
In 1995, Congress responded to the growing patchwork quilt of
state law and enacted the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.' 5 In
order to answer the critical question whether that statute applies
to product configurations that function as trademarks, one must
keep in mind several important aspects of dilution doctrine. First
of all, the cause of action must be authorized by statute; dilution
was never a common law doctrine.'" Second, until the 1995
amendments to the Lanham Act, federal law had never provided
trademark owners with protection from dilution. 7 Third, Schech-
ter's famous article never suggested that product configurations
should be protected from dilution. Fourth, although several federal
courts have assumed without discussion that a state supreme court
" Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813,
825 (1927).
12 RSATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25, cmt. b (1995).
13 1947 Mass. Acts 307. Massachusetts' current statute, MASS. GEN. L. ch. 110B, § 12
(1990), is substantially similar.
14 H.R. Rep. 374, 104th Congr. at 9 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029.
"See 15 U.S.C. 1125(c), supra note 6.
'See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, 3 TRADEMARKS & UNFAIR COMPETITION § 24:13 n.3 (1997).
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would extend the dilution rationale to product packaging, 8 no
state has construed its dilution statute to protect product configura-
tions.19 Finally, several courts have held outright that state
dilution statutes only apply to word marks and not to product
packaging or product shapes.20
This is the background against which Congress established a
federal cause of action for dilution.
II. THE NEW FEDERAL CAUSE OF ACTION FOR DILUTION
The question whether section 1125(c) protects product configura-
tions is purely one of Congressional intent. This essay does not
argue that the Constitution prevents Congress from protecting
product configurations from dilution under its Commerce Clause
power." If Congress intended the phrase "famous mark" to
include product configurations, then Sunbeam is rightly decided.
The best argument that Congress did, in fact, intend to establish
a cause of action for the dilution of famous product configurations
that function as trademarks is found in the generally broad
definition afforded the term "trademark." The term, and its
equivalent "mark,"22 is defined to include "any word, name,
symbol, or device"23 and has been held to include product shapes,
colors, scents, and sounds.24 The initial presumption should be
"a See Coca-Cola Co. v. Alma-Leo U.S.A., Inc., 719 F. Supp. 725, 12 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1487 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to injunction against imitation of
shape of Coca-Cola bottle); Soft Sheen Products, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 408, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1519 (N.D. 11. 1987) (holding that injunction was appropriate where
competitor's package infringed seller's package).
"' I will avoid using the term "trade dress" in this essay. Trade dress is often used to
describe both the package in which a product comes and the shape of the product itself.
Since protecting product shapes under dilution law raises different issues than protecting
product packaging, I will endeavor to keep my terminology clear at all times.
"' See Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 769 (9th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) (cartoon characters not protected under
California dilution statute); Olay Co. v. Cocoacare Products Inc., 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1028
(S.D.N.Y. 1983) (New York dilution law does not apply to packaging);
21 See Paul J. Heald, The Vices of Originality, 1991 SUP. CT. REV. 143, 168-75 (1991)
(discussing Congress's power to enact trademark laws under the Commerce Clause).
22See 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994) (definition of "mark").
2 id.
" See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 514 U.S. 159, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161
(1995) (color of dry cleaner's press-pad subject to trademark protection).
4
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that Congress intended "famous marks" in section 1125(c) 25 to
include product shapes and configurations.
All other evidence, however, suggests that the new and highly
non-traditional cause of action for the dilution of "famous marks"
was not meant to encompass product shapes and configurations.
A. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
As noted above, Congress was not writing on a blank slate when
it enacted the federal dilution statute. The legislative history
demonstrates its awareness of the existing twenty-five states that
had already enacted dilution statutes." It solved the problems
caused by this crazy quilt of local law by enacting a unifying
statute. As noted above, no state ever applied its dilution
statute to protect a product configuration. If Congress's intent was
merely to nationalize pre-existing dilution doctrine, then it is safe
to assume that Congress did not intend product configurations to
be protected.28
The extant express legislative history also provides no evidence
that Congress intended to protect anything beyond word marks
from dilution. The examples contained in the House Report are
those typically offered by pro-dilution activists: Kodak Pianos,
Buick Aspirin, Dupont shoes. 29 Given the absence of any express
2 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (Supp. I) (1995).
See H.R. Rep. No. 374, 104th Cong., 1st sess. 104 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N
1029 ("approximately 25 states have laws that prohibit trademark dilution").
7 See id. ("Court decisions have been inconsistent and some courts are reluctant to grant
nationwide injunctions for violation of state law where half of the states have no dilution
law. Protection for famous marks should not depend on whether the forum where the suit
was filed has a dilution statute."). See Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Services, 618 F. Supp. 381
(N.D. Ill. 1985) (noting possible Commerce Clause problems with nationwide injunctions
based on state law). See also Paul Heald, Comment, Unfair Competition and Federal Law:
Constitutional Restraints on the Scope of State Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1411 (1987)
(discussing problems of applying state law to multistate unfair competition claims).
H.R. Rep. No. 374, 104, supra note 26 ("[The nature and extent of remedies against
trademark dilution varies (sic] from state to state and, therefore, can provide unpredictable
and inadequate results for the trademark owner. The federal remedy . . . will bring
uniformity and consistency.").
"Id. See also Stephen K. Marsh, Recent Development, Patents are Forever: Construing
the Federal Trademark Dilution Act to Apply to Product Configurations in Sunbeam
Products, Inc. v. The West Bend Co., 4 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 412, 427-28 (1997) (discussing the
application of the new trademark dilution statutes to product configuration).
5
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suggestion in Schecter's famous article or the prior case law that
product configurations would be protected, it is not surprising that
the legislative history is silent on the issue.
B. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The best argument against extending federal dilution protection
to product configurations is the sharp conflict such an interpreta-
tion would create with the federal patent law. Under normal
canons of statutory construction, an interpretation that directly
conflicts with existing federal law is disfavored.3 °
1. Design Patents. Federal law already provides an avenue by
which the inventor of a pleasing product configuration may obtain
protection from unauthorized copying even in the absence of
consumer confusion. The Patent Act permits an inventor of a "new,
original and ornamental design for an article of manufacture"3' to
apply for a design patent which is enforceable against all competi-
tors for fourteen years. 2 The design, however, must be "non-
obvious" in order to qualify.33 This requirement prevents protec-
tion of a design which "as a whole would have been obvious at the
time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains."34 The non-obvious-
ness requirement is Congress's attempt to guarantee that the
monopoly cost associated with a patent will be offset by the
creation and eventual availability to the public of a significant
advance over the prior art. The Act was intended to provide
manufacturers such as Sunbeam the ineans to obtain a time-
limited monopoly on their innovative industrial designs.
2. Dilution/Patent Conflict: Evidence from Preemption Cases.
Given the expansive definition of "trademark" under both federal
and state laws, it may seem somewhat curious that state dilution
statutes have not been construed to protect product configurations
'o Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 642, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241 (7th Cir. 1993)
("a Fundamental rule of statutory construction requires that statutes are to be construed,
if possible, in harmony with... other applicable statutes").
3" 35 U.S.C. § 171 (1994).
32 See 35 U.S.C. § 173 (1994).
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that function as trademarks. The best explanation lies not in an
absence of will on the part of the states to protect product configu-
rations from dilution, but rather in the certainty that any attempt
would have been preempted by federal patent law. Most relevant
to our purpose, the preemption rationale would be based on the
direct conflict between an expansive interpretation of dilution
statutes and federal patent law.
The key case is Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.35
In Bonito Boats, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
Florida statute that protected boat hulls from a very effective form
of copying. The Florida law, which had been struck down by the
Florida Supreme Court,3 prohibited the unauthorized copying of
boat hulls through any "direct molding process." 7 In a unani-
mous opinion, the Court held that the anti-molding law directly
conflicted with the goals and objectives underlying the federal
patent law.
The Court began its explanation of the conflict by setting forth
the rationale that underlies the federal patent laws, emphasizing
the "careful balance between the need to promote innovation and
the recognition that imitation and refinement through imitation are
both necessary to invention itself and the very lifeblood of a
competitive economy."38 The balance between the benefits of
innovation and the monopoly costs imposed on the public when an
inventor is granted an exclusive right in an article of manufacture
is maintained in several ways. First, an inventor must apply for a
patent soon after his invention is revealed. 9 On this point, the
Court in Bonito Boats noted, "Once an inventor has decided to lift
the veil of secrecy from his work, he must choose between the
protection of a federal patent or dedication of his idea to the public
35 489 U.S. 141, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1847 (1989) (holding that Supremacy Clause preempted
Florida statute that prohibited the unauthorized molding and copying of boat hulls). See
generally Paul J. Heald, Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption,
76 IOWA L. REV. 959 (1991) (arguing that the goal of federal patent law is to strike a balance
between encouraging invention and imposing monopoly costs on consumers).
3515 So.2d 220, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d 1124 (Fla. 1987), afld 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
' Fla. Stat. ch. 559.94 (1987) (repealed 1991).
3489 U.S. at 146.
"See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1994).
1998]
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at large." ° Second, once the patent term expires, the invention
enters the public domain.4 ' Third, the patent application is made
public once the patent issues, thereby assuring that the public can
learn from the innovation embodied in the invention.42
Most importantly, the novelty and non-obviousness requirements
help maintain the balance between costs and benefits in two
related ways. Requiring an invention to be both new and a
significant leap over prior art "express[es] a congressional determi-
nation that the purposes behind the Patent Clause are best served
by free competition and exploitation of either that which is already
available to the public or that which may be readily discerned from
publicly available material."3 Since public domain material may
not be monopolized, inventors will only obtain exclusive rights
under federal law when they advance their art in a previously
unanticipated way, presumably to the benefit of the public. The
Court found that the "federal patent system thus embodies a
carefully crafted bargain for encouraging the creation and disclo-
sure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances in technology and
design in return for the exclusive right to practice the invention for
a period of years.""
The Court next examined whether the Florida statute directly
conflicted with the patent laws. Under the Supremacy Clause,
state laws that stand "as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress" are
preempted.45 In finding that the Florida molding statute posed a
serious threat to the Patent Act, the Court emphasized that Florida
provided expansive protection to a certain type of product configu-
ration with no requirement of non-obviousness or novelty, no set
time limit for protection, no eventual enlargement of the public
domain, and no necessary disclosure that would enable the public
40 489 U.S. at 149. See also 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994) (patent application must be filed
within one year of first public use).
" Id. at 152 ("We have long held that after the expiration of a federal patent, the subject
matter of the patent passes to the free use of the public as a matter of federal law.").
42 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480-481, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 613
(1974) (discussing importance of the disclosure goals of federal patent law).
43 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 150.
Id. at 150-5 1.
"Gade v. National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (quoting
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)).
422 [Vol. 5:415
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to learn from the product-in other words, Florida made no attempt
to guarantee a public benefit to offset the cost of granting exclusive
rights.46 The Court unanimously held that Florida's anti-molding
statute upset the careful balance between costs and benefits struck
by the Patent Act. The Florida law had all of the monopoly vices
present in the federal patent law, but made no attempt to guaran-
tee an offsetting public benefit."7
Importantly, the Court emphasized that not all state laws
protecting product configurations were preempted. It noted that a
product configuration that functioned as a trademark could be
protected under a state law that required the owner prove a
likelihood that consumers would be confused as to the source of the
unauthorized copy.4 In other words, federal patent law does not
preempt traditional confusion-based trademark law causes of
action: "States may place limited regulations on the circumstances
in which such designs are used in order to prevent consumer
confusion as to source."'9 The Court made this point clear in its
express reaffirmance 0 of its prior holdings in Sears, Roebuck &
Co. v. Stiffel Co.5 and Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc.52
In Sears, the Court examined an interpretation of an Illinois
unfair competition law that prohibited the slavish copying of a
product configuration, specifically, a pole lamp.5" Again, the Court
held that a state law that established a cause of action for mere
copying, requiring no further proof of any other element, directly
conflicted with the goals and objectives of federal patent law.'
Providing a scheme of protection for articles of manufacture is the
province of Congress, not the states. The states' prerogative, at
least as far as the protection of product configurations goes, is
limited to protecting consumers and preventing the "misleading [of)
purchasers as to the source of the goods."5
' See Heald, supra note 35, at 982-988.
47 Id.
489 U.S. 141 at 154.
4 Id. at 154.
50Id. at 157.
" 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
52 376 U.S. 234 (1964).
376 U.S. 225 (1964).
"Id.
376 U.S. at 232.
1998] 423
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Bonito Boats and Sears leave little room to doubt that a state
dilution statute applied to prohibit the slavish copying of a product
configuration would be preempted. Both opinions emphasize that
a state can provide protection under a likelihood of consumer
confusion rationale, but as noted above,6" dilution statutes do not
require proof of likelihood of confusion. In fact, the absence of the
requirement is their whole raison d'tre. Like the laws at issue in
Bonito Boats and Sears, dilution statutes, at least as applied to
product configurations, are designed solely to protect manufacturers
and insulate them from competition. Applying a dilution statute to
a product configuration would, like the Florida anti-molding statute
or the Illinois unfair competition law, result in patent-like protec-
tion with no attempt to guarantee that the cost of protection would
be offset by some sort of public benefit.
The one opinion directly on point finds the absence of a confusion
requirement deadly and concludes that a state dilution statute
cannot be applied to protect industrial designs:
The New York dilution statute as applied to poten-
tially patentable designs goes beyond the limited
regulation permitted by Bonito Boats... Under the
statute, plaintiffs attempt to enjoin defendants from
making, using or selling bottle designs which alleged-
ly mimic the Escada bottle design. ... Were the
statute to be so applied, a would-be inventor in New
York would not have to meet the rigorous standards
for obtaining a patent and his right to exclude
copiers would not be confined to a design patent's 14
year limit.57
A state may not upset the balance of interests between consumer
and manufacturer that Congress has so carefully weighed in the
Patent Act by offering its own cut-rate protection for product
configurations.
"See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
67 Escada AG v. The Limited, Inc., 810 F. Supp. 571, 574 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). See also
Reebok Int'l Ltd. v. K-mart Corp., 849 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (preempting application
of state dilution statute to product configuration covered by federal design patent).
[Vol. 5:415424
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This sub-section must conclude by noting that Congress, of
course, is not constrained by the Supremacy Clause in the same
way that states are. Congress can, and sometimes does, tinker
with the Patent Act and readjust the balance established therein.
The question addressed in this paper is whether we should
interpret the Federal Trademark Dilution Act as a sub silentio
attempt to recraft the patent law balance. The preemption cases
discussed above make it clear that dilution protection for product
configurations presents a conflict with patent law. How should we
resolve the conflict? Should a judge interpret the word "mark" in
the dilution statute not to include product configurations or should
she conclude that Congress intended to rework the nature of
patent law by amending the trademark law? Additional help in
answering this question can be gleaned from cases that discuss how
the federal patent and trademark laws should be read together.
3. Dilution/Patent Conflict: Evidence from Registration Cases.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed a relevant question that
is currently percolating in the lower federal courts. Can a product
configuration be registered as a trademark in the Patent and
Trademark Office? Several courts have answered yes, 8 although
one could plausibly argue that by providing design patent protec-
tion for innovative product configurations for a limited fourteen-
year term, Congress intentionally precluded the potentially eternal
protection afforded by federal trademark law. These cases examine
the conflict that could arise when a product configuration is
potentially protected under both federal trademark law and federal
patent law. Although most courts have concluded that trademark
registration of product configurations does not create a conflict with
patent law, the rationale of the decisions supports my thesis about
dilution.
For example, in Kohler Co. v. Moen Inc.," Kohler asked the
Seventh Circuit to reverse the Patent and Trademark Office's
ruling that Moen could register one of its faucet designs as a
trademark. In upholding the PTO's position, the court discussed at
" See Application of Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925,.140 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 575
(C.C.P.A. 1964) (holding bottle shape proper subject matter for trademark); Kohler Co. v.
Moen Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d 1241 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding shape of faucet may be
registered as a trademark).
5 12 F.3d 632 (7th Cir. 1993).
19981 425
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length whether allowing a patentable product configuration to be
registered as a trademark would create an irreconcilable conflict
with federal design patent protection.' Recognizing that core
principles of statutory interpretation required it to read patent and
trademark laws together in such a way as to avoid conflict, the
court seized upon the consumer confusion distinction made in the
preemption cases discussed above. It held that merely allowing a
product configuration to be registered as a trademark did not
conflict with the goals of patent law because registration does not
grant a trademark owner an exclusive right to manufacture and
sell a product.6 1
In an insightful and critically important passage the court
explained:
As we have noted, federal trademark protection for
a product's configuration does not create a monopoly
in the use of the product's shape. Moen is not "free
from effective competition in the market for a popu-
lar brand of faucet." Dissent at 650. Moen simply
has the right to preclude others from copying its
trademarked product for the purpose of confusing the
public as to its source. Kohler is free to copy Moen's
design so long as it insures that the public is not
thereby deceived or confused into believing that its
copy is a Moen faucet.2
In other words, as long as federal trademark protection for product
configurations is based on a consumer confusion rationale, no
conflict is presented with federal patent law. This is consistent
with the Supreme Court's insistence in Bonito Boats that state laws
that protect the public from confusion and deception are not
preempted, even when the trademarked subject matter is a
potentially patentable product configuration.
Kohler and its progeny assume that Congress does not normally
shoot itself in the foot when it enacts trademark laws. In the case
Go Id. at 636-643.
61 Id. at 637.
2Id. at 640 n.10 (emphasis added).
426 [Vol. 5:415
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of product configurations, the one narrow area where patent
protection and trademark protection potentially overlap, trademark
law will not be read to provide patent-like rights to industrial
designers.
4. Conclusion. The bottom line of Kohler and Bonito Boats is
clear: Trademark law and patent law only collide when trademark
law is construed to protect product configurations in the absence of
consumer confusion. Interpreting the Federal Trademark Dilution
Act to apply to product configurations, therefore, presents grave
difficulties. The whole point of the Act is to do away with the
requirement of proving likelihood of confusion. The serious
conflicts identified in the preemption and registration cases will
arise if the Act is construed to protect product configurations in the
absence of confusion. The most sensible way to avoid the conflict
is to narrow the interpretation of the word "mark" in 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c) to exclude product configurations. A broader interpretation
conflicts with federal patent policy and would result in a bizarre,
significant, back-handed, and almost undoubtedly unintentional
amendment to federal patent law. When the key focus is Congres-
sional intent, such an interpretation seems quite implausible.
III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
The court's opinion in Sunbeam does not even consider the
existence of the conflict it produces. It blindly creates a new type
of property right without even questioning whether this accords
with Congressional intent. This lack of sensitivity to the costs
associated with the creation of property rights and the interest of
the public in a competitive marketplace and healthy public domain
consigns Sunbeam to the top of my scrapheap of truly bad intellec-
tual property decisions. On its face, it appears quite inoffensive,
but the reality of its insensitivity to the public interest is truly
disheartening.
What would be the cost of the widespread adoption of the rule
created in Sunbeam? Higher prices, for certain. How come?
Protecting a product configuration under the Sunbeam rationale
looks much like the grant of exclusive rights afforded by design
patent law. Just as if it had a patent, Sunbeam would obtain the
absolute right to prevent competitors from copying its product
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configuration. Although the monopoly conferred by a design patent
is not nearly so powerful as that conferred by a utility patent, the
grant of exclusive rights is nonetheless generally presumed to raise
prices. In fact, patent law is constructed on the assumption that
the value of the new creations stimulated by the possibility of
earning a monopoly profit outweighs the short-term cost. As noted
above, however, Congress seehl to assure this benefit by only
granting monopoly rights to new and non-obvious inventions and
by limiting the rights granted to a twenty-year term.
Unfortunately, the Sunbeam rationale provides patent-like
protection, and therefore presumably imposes patent-like costs,
with none of the assurances of public benefit contained in the
patent law. The dilution statute does not require that the protect-
ed configuration be new or non-obvious, nor is protection limited by
any limited time term. Given the care with which Congress has
crafted the patent law, the assumption of the court in Sunbeam
that Congress meant to establish a new and wildly different design
patent regime by amending the trademark laws is simply not
credible. As Justice Breyer noted in Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson
Products Co., Inc.,' "It is the province of patent law, not trade-
mark law, to encourage invention by granting inventors a monoply
over new product designs."'
The most outrageous feature of the opinion is the blindness with
which the court buys Sunbeam's argument. It seems completely
unaware of the impact of what it is doing. In a case where the
public interest is at stake, a court must be particularly vigilant.
Intellectual property cases usually involve two businesses repre-
sented by lawyers whose clients are mostly other businesses.
Consumers are seldom, if ever, litigants. Their voice and their
interests are sometimes obscured by the property-rights laden
rhetoric of attorneys seeking to advance the anti-competitive
interests of their clients. This is part of the explanation why
professors of intellectual property law have been so active lately
filing amicus briefs that emphasize the public interest at issue in
514 U.S. 159 (1995).
4 Id. at 164.
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high-profile litigation.8 Courts need to be constantly aware, as
the court in Sunbeam was not, that the creation of a property right
always entails a public cost and that Congress may not have
intended the public to bear the brunt of diminished competition.
IV. CONCLUSION
Perhaps the most important canon of statutory interpretation
violated by the court in Sunbeam is that Congress is not foolish.
Contrary to its unreasoned assumption, the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act can be read in a way that does not conflict with the
federal patent laws and interpreted so that it does not undermine
the careful balance struck by Congress in the protection of
industrial design. Given the history of the statute and the
interpretive rationales provided by the long line of preemption and
registration cases preceding it, the word "mark" in 15 U.S.C. §
1125(c) cannot possibly have been intended by Congress to include
product configurations. If"mark" is construed as suggested herein,
then the federal patent and trademark laws will continue to rest
comfortably together, as Congress undoubtedly intended.
' See, e.g., Lotus Development Corp. v. Borland Intl, 49 F.3d 807, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d 1014
(1st Cir. 1995) (in which no less than ten amicus briefs were filed).
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